

*Endre Kiss*

## 'Global' as 'Absolute' Turning Direct; or the Present as a Philosophical Problem

In 1989, Francis *Fukuyama* published an inquiry about the 'End of History', which became world-famous in no time. Looking back from latter times, we may need to mention, at that time Michail Gorbatshev's Soviet Union was still existing in its full, so this theory didn't draw its consequences as Minerva's owl at all, on the contrary, it was standing right in a historical process, not the least, it gained its then whirling dynamism from this.

In this theoretical experiment, Fukuyama made a first attempt to place a world-historical process -of which 'Glasnost' beginning in 1985, then 'Perestroika' were only *representations*, though most important ones -into a historical-philosophical, and as we later explain more in detail, into a *universal-historical* frame.

The category of 'universal philosophy of history' used here needs to be explained. We think, the clear conceptual separation of 'philosophy of history' and 'universal philosophy of history' makes it easier to understand this problem adequately. Philosophy of history has a task of philosophically reflecting the *whole*, the total process of human history according to unified criteria, and *presenting it as well, in its totality*. On the other hand, universal philosophy of history does not have the task of *re-creating* a philosophically reflected historical process in principle in its totality, according to unified criteria. Its approach is more of an essentialist kind. Its task is to formulate a unified concept for the whole of history, which also gives a direct and *causal theoretical explanation* of the essential determination of the whole process. Instead of re-creating on the whole, here there is a special task of emphasizing and putting in centre the most important measure(s) with a claim on causality. This difference, by the way, can be studied the best at Hegel. In his lectures about 'The Philosophy of World-History', he stands for a philosophy of history taken in a classical sense, and *re-creates* a theoretically multiple times examined and reconstructed historical process in a classical way, having its effect up to these days. The concept of fight for regard, the so-called 'Master-Slave' relation in *The Phenomenology of Mind* is a classical of modern (and what is not the least irrelevant) *non-anglo-saxon universal historical philosophies*. So, Hegel himself is an excellent example for the fact, that these two variants of historical philosophy reaching into one another, both general and universal, still different in their central points *can appear with classical clarity even in the life-work of the same philosopher*.

The theory of the 'end of history' therefore placed the turn of 1989 not so much into a classically historical-philosophical, but more into a strong *universal-historical* frame, what was -looking at the importance of this turn- a logical and crucial process. This universal-historical extension of a great historical turn was utterly legitimate; of course it's a different question, that each political culture takes historical-philosophical, if not right universal historical-philosophical extension of concrete political events to a different extent, not mentioning the fact, that such a philosophical generalization also bears opposing interests, of which not even those fierce discussions can be considered as primarily theoretical conflicts.

Historical-philosophical extension and at the same time generalization of a concrete historical event or turn inevitably recalls the specific science-theoretical problem of *singular* historical events. During this process namely, an essentially singular event becomes universal according

to definition, and the criteria of transformation themselves -just because of the condition of historical singularity- can't be universal. Presuming all possible perspectivistic variants of answering this raising of a problem, we are convinced that shutting down the divided world (and the 'peaceful' character of this shutdown previously and principally foretold by everyone to be impossible) can be considered in all circumstances a positive base which does not only bear, but even demand historical-philosophical extension or generalization. This complex division of a special character was namely an undoubtedly defining fact of world-history after 1945. Division literally defined all essential features of the two world orders directly, furthermore in a way that these definitions were not scattered or falling-apart, but were built upon the great duality universally and obviously.

In the classical era of the Cold War, extreme confrontation infiltrated all fields of social life, and it made 'the sharpening of the battle of classes' the daily problem of every life-sphere. *Thus, the reality of division made the division universal efficiently indeed;* the universal-historical extension of this universality (then of the elimination of this universality) on such bases doesn't seem at all, to be a measure of theoretical reconstruction needing legitimation all the time.

The confrontation of political regimes extended to extremes and infiltrating to all sectors of social life to a greatest extent of course immediately appeared on the field of ideology (also in the most extreme way, today only recalled at the level of cabaret-jokes, in which the mention of 'North-Alban' movies could be made complete by grammatical figures like 'the hand of the enemy has stepped inside'), following from what a picture of two separate worlds *as universes* was drawn, differing from each other really in everything, moreover on a condition, that between the two worlds of a completely different kind (of which both thought of themselves as the ultimate 'good one', and the other one as the embodiment of 'evil') no crossing of a border was allowed, that was considered right the greatest crime possible (1); the creation of enemy-images took a measure unknown before, and even identity found its final definitions in the *friend-enemy-relationship* embodied in everything and including everything. It's a characteristic connection in international politics, that even states and political forces originally not represented in this opposition made so extreme could only get to a position in which they could attempt to politically and economically organize themselves at all, after the definite decrease of opposition(2).

As the divided world was to be considered a concrete basic figure, which the globalization of the era had taken (while this divided basic structure itself was of course capable of carrying the real development of globalization only temporarily), so was the ending of the divided world initiated by Gorbatschov a latter specified form of globalization. According to our original conditions, 'the end of division' can also be taken as the 'end of history' (inasmuch as it had happened not rarely with complete evidence, the divided world was considered the *final form* of international politics, economy and ideology not only temporarily, but also in an absolute sense) (3).

Uniting the divided world from a specifically Gorbatschov-kind of starting point raises quite sharply the problem of historical *foresight* in general, but also in specific sense (this latter one in a great context, which meant the completely unexpected and unexpectedly happened self-abolishment of a whole world regime and a world order connected to it most closely). Such an emphatic unfore-sight of latter events lead not one critic, moreover hidden or explicit enemy of political science established so far, to sharp attacks against the dedicated representatives of this science. Although it's not our opinion, that the astonishing indifference towards social

sciences experienced nowadays could be brought into any connection with this heroic failure of foresight in 1989, the divergent motion between positions sciences have evidently taken and reality's processes, raises undoubtedly weighty and relevant methodological questions, which put the legitimacy of all elements to the test again and again (4).

The question of foresight or unforesight makes our interest towards Fukuyama's theory topical again. Not only because the first really known theoretical utterance comes from the time of the existing Soviet Union, so it actually couldn't be analyzed in connection with foresight. From this point of view, Fukuyama simply reacted quickly; in the age of general lingering and uncertainty (which lasted quite long indeed), he theoretically characterized an exception, from what grew later a new great historical trend, and which trend apparently bumped into the rocks of unforesight. But his quick response, which bears proof of remarkably good intellectual reflexes still can't disqualify sciences directly or indirectly interested in foresight.

*Of what consists therefore the crucial fact of which the great world-historical change was not to be forecast? Instead of political and historical facts, in this function we would mention a structural and science-historical fact. For in the structure of the problem, 'historical or historical-philosophical' and 'political or international political' dimensions strongly separate from each other. An insight of historical magnitude and value, and therefore reaching to the territory of historical philosophy, according to which communism had come to a declining stage, was originally completely inappropriate for international politics and therefore on the whole dimension of politics, as according to valid and not only formally unwithdrawn basic definitions, a presumably right insight getting more and more general couldn't have had any direct political consequences. Right theoretical point of view was not to be extended into the direction of real politics and therefore into the direction of real-political forecast. And as anyone who deals with any kind of forecast, can only keep his eyes on the basic definitions of this field, the turn of 1989 obviously couldn't have been foresought. The fact that Fukuyama had a lucky hand also became clear as he didn't raise his basic question from the side of end or non-end, but following the trace of Gorbatschov, he immediately tried to place the defining changes in attitudes of Soviet political elite into a world-historical frame.*

The fact most important from a universal-historical point of view is of a *complex and synthetical* kind. It equals the expiry of a historical moratorium the regime of existing socialism acquired. Every institute with a historical way of existence (and thus also the regime of existing socialism) has a 'moratorium' which provides time for it to consolidate, actualize its inner motives and in this actuality either to settle among possible institutes and organizations, or cease to exist as this moratorium expires. The idea of historical and historical-philosophical moratorium was built into the theoretical set of resources of post-socialist transformation by the author of these lines, after he thoroughly became familiar with Erik H. Erikson's social-psychologically oriented conception of identity some time ago, which worked out this idea for the sake of a realistic and differentiated portrayal of the situation of youth growing into society. We'd like to make use of variants in meanings of the idea of moratorium that are right the most important at Erikson. *Historical, historical-philosophical moratorium namely means a sudden change of expectations looking from the point of a historical subject.* What used to be possible, moreover trouble-free during the emergence of the moratorium, suddenly becomes impossible, moreover a milestone of scandal at the expiry of the moratorium. This *seemingly* unexpected, but actually totally logical change of expectations in fact manifested itself in connection with the regime of existing socialism (5).

Drawing the intellectual element of historical (moreover, we may emphasize it without any stylistic exaggeration, *epoch-making*) moratorium into this present theory of post-socialistic change of regime plays an inevitable role in the understanding of the phenomenon. All the things that happened to existing socialism during existing socialism, couldn't have been imaginable in another status or situation of historical – world-historical moratorium. *It was exactly the complete run-out of world-historical moratorium what made up the essence of the inner and outer system of conditions of a peaceful change of regime.* And it was exactly this run-out of the moratorium that made possible what wouldn't have been even imaginable in case of the existence of the historical – world-historical moratorium relevant to existing socialism. Therefore, the problem of world-historical moratorium also answers the question of presumed or actual deficiencies of foresight. *Gorbatshev started a reform of existing socialism unknown before, of which historical – historical-philosophical moratorium had decreased critically.*

Concerning the concrete components of the historical – historical-philosophical moratorium of existing socialism, we must deem it obvious that in 1968, with the Czechoslovakian entry this moratorium became airy already, at least perspectively. It's clear even without closer reasoning, what this turn meant from the point of historical – world-historical moratorium. Merciless (and as the title of an insightful Andrzej Wajda movie of the era put it, 'without anesthesia') did it ruin the hopes for an established reform-communist structure capable of bowing over historical periods and standing on principal bases, which alone had the chance to prolong the historical – historical-philosophical moratorium of existing socialism. As the moratorium of a then state of existing socialism was *predestined to be temporary* in a classical way; Post-Stalinism, the era later occasionally called Brezhnevism or recession could only prolong the real moratorium of existing socialism, because it was actually leading out of actual Stalinism. The 1968 forfeit of its temporary moratorium lead inevitably to taking this moratorium back. We solely add for the sake of conceptual completeness, that from our point of raising the question it's totally neutral, whether an operable reform-communist formation of state-authority standing on its own basis is possible (was possible). This question doesn't change a jot in the question of the moratorium becoming airy, which surrounded the 1989 post-socialist change of regime like a thick fluid, and determined conditions and circumstances (thus of course also the conditions of 'foresight', of forecast) a great deal, among which the stages of this progress took place, which hadn't met any past expectations (6). The negative and temporary moratorium (and following from this, a temporary legitimation of negative content) of post-stalinism couldn't switch to another moratorium of positive contents and legitimation gained for more eras. The entry, call it a symptom of deeper processes and connections or a defining intervention from the outside, exterminated the historical – historical-philosophical moratorium of the regime of existing socialism in a way that it showed, an actually existing reform-communist state-apparatus doesn't exist. This coerced recognition had a definitive effect in both important directions. First, it made impossible the followers of reform-communism who were believing in this apparatus as a 'final' political solution. But it also gave unmistakable signs to those, for whom the reform-communist apparatus was an imperative stage towards different, more liberal social formations. But this defining historical turn had its consequences for the politics or attitude of the ruling strata as well. On one side, in a certain sense only indicated here, the battle of values really infiltrated the thinking of existing socialist elite (while we of course don't consider as a crucial measure the fact that they made several evident values of liberal capitalism their own, but the fact that this process became equal to immanently giving up the reason of its own apparatus to exist, what is on the whole an unmistakable consequence of the

disappearance of the moratorium). On the other side, the cease of the moratorium put an increasing pressure on the leading stratus of politics for the sake of a pragmatic, in Carl Schmitt's sense 'decisionist' solution, as *it really showed up with all its force, in the actually decisive character of Perestroika* (its understanding is of course being set back up to these days, by the fact that it was society of existing socialism itself, that could hardly get an insight of the secrets of the real behavior of ruling strata) (7).

It's right the insight to the problem of the expiry of historical – world-historical moratorium that sets those real boundary conditions that explain the variants of interpreting the world-historical turn, and thus the 'End of History' theory too. There wasn't one theory (not even the 'end of history' theory) that could have carried the giant turn if only in its elements, without the conditions concerning the moratorium and concluding from the moratorium. This is tightly bound (in the eyes of many, it's equal ) to the recognition, that it was this moratorium that made possible practically all elements of the turn, of which actualization was unimaginable of definitive structural and political reasons, until the expiry of historical – world-historical moratorium.

It's not easy to discover behind this statement, what can be considered history-theoretically *specific*. The insight to the necessity of a turn, or the practical-instrumental impossibility of making this turn (or the sharp and obvious insight to it) implies especially decisive patterns of action getting into the foreground, practically by itself. Nothing shows the whole weightiness of the case better than the fact that this contradiction prevented even the possibility of a line-up of a *par excellence* decisive solution, up to Gorbatshev.

As the expiry of the historical – world-historical moratorium was a defining fact of the singular world-historical turn of 1989, its also universal historical reflexion is not only legitimate in general, but it's also necessary. This singular event of universal historical-philosophical quality lead to raising the question of 'end of history' right through the expiry of a moratorium of a similar dimension. At this point, it makes significant theoretical insights possible if we remind (ourselves) to the fact, that the thought of 'end of history' did come up in the history of philosophy up to that time not seldom at all, as the way of actualizing Hegel's *Master-Slave* problem as well as in other ways. The grandiose vision of Albert Camus, 'Napoleon's Book of Laws' remained totally unknown in philosophical tradition (8). Arnold Gehlen's concept of 'end of history' (9), which is different from the case of Camus in a respect that the theoretical context itself, within which the concept of 'end of history' cristallized was strongly debated in its age, didn't gain much more attention either. Without any visible sign of astonishment did international philosophical public opinion accept it too, when a quite well grounded study of special philosophical-historical orientation featured only studies and concepts of that time, which were dealing with the theoretically interpreted problem of 'end of history' (10). In this contrast, the legitimacy of opinions opposed to the theoretical explanation declaring 1989 the 'end of history' not only on a low level in general but not once also with an attitude of offended personal concernedness, is being questioned from a new side. It shows that people representing this view had no idea of the philosophical frequency, moreover, the self-evidence of this raising of a question. This also enlightens it right painfully, how unimaginable a philosophy is held by many, which describes history or society with an intensity that would have its direct consequences for the interpretation of this history or society.

*History-theoretically, the end of history depends on the definition by which history had been defined. The history of a state, an institute or a science always depends on the fate of a subject who 'carries' this history, in other words, of whose history we're talking about.*

The history of a sports club comes to an end when the club breaks up. Well, general, universal history can also be given a comprehensive definition (moreover, we think about it on a basis of comprehensive definitions even if we're not aware of it –the representatives of *Ancien Régime* were clearly aware of the existence of measures which had constituted history for them, but they were also aware of history 'coming to an end' indeed with 1789, when all these conditions fell) (11).

*We've got to make the possibility of a meaningful inquiry about the 'End of History' directly depending not so much on the justification of abstract-general requirements, but on the existence or fall of criteria by which existence we've defined the historical process itself (consciously, or in a given situation without conscious reflection).* The question of criteria depends first on choosing the historical-philosophical subject, but in a given situation it can also be particular in other ways. It's a ridiculous but formally reasonable example, if someone, say, names the continual operation of firemen-brassbands as the criterion of the dynamical existence of historical process. In this case, closing down the operation of the last firemen-brassband becomes a qualified case of the end of history. The same logic suddenly swings over to the sphere of philosophical seriousness, if we modify it like say, there is a possible view, according to which the existence of Christianity is the real criterion of history (before its evolving, or after its possible ending it's not possible to talk about history). In this case, any kind of this religion's termination would also be equal to the end of history, as the definition of history *doesn't simply cover a loose aggregate of events, but it possesses special perspectivism and criteria.* Of course –and here we're returning to an earlier point of our train of thought- leading perspectives, as well as leading criteria are in fact not only impossible to be particular beyond a certain boundary, but in fact they must be reasonably comprehensive, really specific, and total. This explains, why do the most significant concepts of the end of history arrive to Hegel's *Phenomenology* (and within this, the famous 'Master-Slave' – chapter).

Thus, *what we consider the real criterion of the end of history in this case* is especially significant not only concerning our present issue (is it possible to interpret the world-historical turn of 1989 as the end of history), but also from general methodological aspects. Based on the things explained above, that's what determinates whether a theoretical hypothesis is or is not to be represented.

*Namely, against all appearances, the fact that the division of the world came to an end wasn't the basis of the criterion,* although nobody could have denied that this division was also a fact of world-historical relevance, our train of thought has also touched upon several respects of it above. From this also follows of course, that 1989 was not to be categorized as the end of history because the divided world ceased to exist. This case might be an example for understanding the rest of inadequate interpretations for the theory of the end of history. Exactly the same way was the theoretical presumption of the end of history not based on the phenomenon of the 'victory of liberalism' or the 'defeat of existing socialism', although both likely-to-be turning points undoubtedly acquired world-historical dimensions. We could bring further examples (the end of the fight of ideas, the end of the era of social state, etc.); but we can be content with justifying our methodologically extremely important thesis about the concrete and determined dependence of a theory on criteria, in the actual course of discussion. Of course it's true, (and it makes the whole coherent line of questions we desire to clear a great deal more complicated) that the end of the cold war or division, the end of existing

socialism, and the victory of liberalism are isomorphic phenomena quite deeply connected with each other. Of course, neither does it all mean, that any of these measures mentioned could still be a criterion of the end-of-history theory, nor does it mean, that looking at these grand events we could talk (or could have talked) about the end of history in some loose, impressionistic way.

As the interpretation of the grand turn as the 'End of History' was several times so obviously unaware of the real criterion of such a qualification, against our intentions we tend to have some understanding for the ones who interpret this theory inadequately. *Not knowing a criterion seems to explain the shortcomings of the interpretation of the theory in this case.* It surely must not have been an everyday situation. At one time did appear as the turn of actual history a great structural change in political world order (the cessation of a divided world), in a sense the world-wide victory of liberalism took place, and as last, not independent from this(these?), the rivalry of ideologies ended, and the social regime of existing socialism announced its own ending in a spectacular way (with all of its consequences); for a looser view of political theory, maybe one characterized by different criteria, any of these turns, or even their aggregation could have been called the end of history without any problem. But this didn't happen. *Another element made up the criterion of applying the end of history* (12).

We get closer to revealing the real criteria of this view, if we examine Fukuyama's references on *Kant*. Recalling Kant in the interpretation of the universal-historical problems after 1989 is in fact much more far-flung than what historical distance implies. For example, the 200 years anniversary of the publishment of *Eternal peace* in 1995 extensively proved the contemporary and concession-less applicability of Kant's universal philosophy of history (13). Fukuyama, relying on these correspondences, finds a variant of the end-of-history theory at Kant too: "Kant suggested that history would have an end point, that is to say, a final purpose that was implied in man's current potentialities and which made the whole of history intelligible. This end point was the realization of human freedom...The achievement of...a...civic constitution and its universalization throughout the world would then be the criterion by which one could understand progress in history" (14). We can't undertake the interpretation of possible parallelisms appearing here; we're partly excused from this task right by some aimed aspirations of the Kant-literature of the nineties (15).

But we can eventually get to the criterion of the end-of-history theory at hand only if we make *the criteria of this criterion explicit*. This auxiliary operation should be undoubtedly an independent part of this theory. Looking back when drawing up this operation, again, we should show some understanding for several misinterpretations of the end-of-history theory, as a greater part of these these misinterpretations *is rooted right in a false pre-ordination of the theory's criteria, moreover, as we have mentioned it already, these falsely pre-ordained criteria on their own even satisfied a world-historical turn's requirements of interpretation on the surface*. Making criteria explicit is a succession of special measures, while we also have to affirmate each measure made explicit already, that is, we have to agree with them, as without such an approval, further stages of explication wouldn't even be possible.

It's a widespread cliché of philosophical analysis, that the philosophical interpretation of history takes place through an extensively interpreted Master-Slave relation. From the concrete definition of this cliché follows, that the outcome of this battle equals the end of history. Therefore, this thesis can by no means be considered new (16).

The case of the *second thesis* is far more complicated. This thesis goes like this, paraphrased by the author: existing socialism, even in its form embodied by the Soviet Union, is *an institute (institutional system) of which the theoretical and practical acceptance of the Master-Slave relation was characteristic*. Fukuyama's variant of the end-of-history theory shows its *imperfect* expoundedness at a point like this, and it evokes all relevant dangers that may come from it. Namely, this thesis can be divided into two theses itself. *One* organic element of the thesis is the problem of ideological, i.e. Marxist-Leninist determination of the existing socialism (17). If we solve this problem in a positive way, follows the expounding of the *second* element of the question: whether Marxism-Leninism can really be related to the original Master-Slave problem. With an ideology-critical analysis applied with a remarkable change of perspectives and methodological exclusiveness one can get to represent a view according to which this connection can be made: Marx takes Hegel's Master-Slave logic at a young age already, and later it will become and will remain a part of his more mature philosophy, not depending on how the relationship of the later Marx to philosophy is being judged. This train of thought sufficiently justifies the characteristics of the situation indicated before. The explication of the criterion takes place in several successive measures (like the ones we're just talking about), while *affirmation is required at every single measure*, that is, we have to accept the independent truth-content of each stage of explication (for example, whether philosophical Soviet-Marxism can really be related to the philosophical Master-Slave problem) (18). It's obvious namely, that *only the acceptance of each and every measure of explication can lead to the validation of a criterion*; we can consider existing socialism a society which had constituted in the sense of acceptance of Master-Slave relation (and of which further enforcement Michail Gorbatshev renounced) only if we accept it theoretically as well, that 1) Philosophical Marxism and 2) Soviet-Marxism had been formulated in this sense too. If we follow this logic to the end, at the same time we explicate what *Fukuyama himself didn't explicate at all*, we explain what he didn't explain.

This philosophical explication now continues in two more—if we like fragile, if we like straight ironic- political-politological theses. In non-philosophical but political dimensions namely, the divided world recalled in our preface more times, used the Master-Slave scheme basically and with no boundaries. While Soviet-Marxist ideology considered the Western World a classical regime of domination and servitude, in an exact mirror-symmetrical way, the Western World defined existing socialism a desperate society of domination and servitude. But we must emphasize, this perpetual presence of domination and servitude in the divided world wasn't interpreted according to the Hegel-Kojev basic definition. *This presence is a political form of the philosophical basic definition, and that's why it's not the criterion of the truth-content of the theory* (19).

The official philosophy of Marxism-Leninism is by no means a philosophical acme of our century. But the concrete, Gorbatshev-like form of renouncing an ideology is undoubtedly a crucial turn, and it upgrades Soviet-Marxism for the Lord-Servant problem residually hiding in it. This almost unprecedented interweaving of philosophy, ideology, international politics, global hegemony in the era of the divided world is the straight causal reason of the fact that a kind of 'announcement' of the cessation of division must begin in this philosophical-ideological sphere, even if the ideology itself has practically lost its society-forming power (20).

The theoretical order listed above also revealed the real criterion of the end-of-history theory (*end of history=renouncing a social structure based on the acceptance of the Master-Slave problem and the representation of a philosophy of ideological validity, on a ground that we*

*had accepted the Master-Slave story as the real construction of history*). By this we also stated that *only in this sense*, i.e. only based on this criterion can we talk about the end of history at all; that's what a huge majority of critics of this theory tend to forget about. Renouncing a history –and ideology-constituting theory is basically the measure, on which a new thesis of 'the world-wide victory of liberalism' could rely. This also means, this thesis basically has hardly any consequences concerning the *political* fate of liberalism.

But, as renouncing history-constituting elements (Master-Slave relation and taking it as a basis) of course didn't take place in a vacuum, but it was a consequence of the great ascendance of liberal values, *we can't raise any objection against interpreting the thesis of the world-wide victory of liberalism in a concrete political space*. But it will become (it has become) a new and basic difficulty of the liberalism-problem interpreted in this space, that a criticism not differentiated enough tries to doubt the thesis of the world-wide victory of liberal values by demonstratively referring to the facts of the advancing world-history of the nineties. The biggest flaw of this logic is that it doesn't make a distinction between the world-historical and definitive fact of the victory of liberal values, and the political deficiencies of the new situation. The world-wide victory of the values of liberalism is one thing; the international politics of the nineties that should have definitely brought the new basic situation into new objective structures, is another one. If someone has the impression the values of liberalism haven't entirely won, he can be right in this judgement, but no right judgement can take back the definitive victory of these values at the beginning of the nineties. *Theoretical evidences and evident forecasts not actualizing is not an independent theoretical problem* (21). It's more like the actual formers of politics to interpret their own failures of any reason, as deficiencies of a theory.

Nevertheless, at this point a new question is being raised. And it's not a question of success or failure, by which politics and society related to the definitive starting point of the world-history of the early nineties.

## NOTES

(1) The self-evident fact of a divided world, which itself has been honored with minimal scientific interest so far, becomes outstandingly relevant in this frame. In the theoretical lightning needed, the inexhaustible genre of comparing regimes, in not one state raised to the rank of an independent discipline, of course gets the highness it deserves, and the so-called 'convergence' –theory can also appear in its full weightiness.

(2) It says a lot, that the disintegration of the colony system took place *after* the evolving of the divided world, while the political alliance of developing countries was already a *reaction* to the fact of division. All this can sufficiently illustrate the fact, that even the *third world* could hardly get separated from the defining fact of division.

(3) The multiple history-theoretical dimensions of this statement can be found at other places in this inquiry. At this place, we would only refer to a specifically philosophical measure, as *while the resistance towards the acceptance of the idea of 'end of history' was to be considered perpetual in the nineties, how many institutes and characters of the divided world were actually existing in a way as there could come nothing after them in history* (of course the same thing goes for several institutes and characters of the era following the cold war, including the *social state* itself).

(4) The fact of the lack of foresight is being generally acknowledged, but its reasons have hardly been analyzed with real theoretical aspiration. One exception: *Did we foresee it coming? (Láttuk-e előre, hogy jön?* (Budapest, 1992).)

(5) We quote three definitions of Erik H. *Erikson* which enlighten the most important definitions of moratorium placed in a new context in this paper: 'This period can be considered a psycho-social moratorium, in which a young adult has to find himself a suitable place in his own society by experimenting with roles...' (p160); 'Under a psycho-social moratorium we mean therefore the postponement of obligations or restrictions concerning grown-ups, still there's not only postponement in question. It's a period characterized by a selective compliance of society' (p181); 'A real moratorium must acquire temporal boundaries and it must close down' (p297). All quotations are from: Erik H. Erikson: *Jugend und Krise. Die Psychodynamik im sozialen Wandel*. Stuttgart, 1970. Original English version was published in 1968.

(6) The impossibility of reform-communism is also a measure, which is a significant background-component of the situation and theory of the end of history analyzed here. More about this from the author of these lines: 'Between Stalinism and Cultural Revolution' ("Sztálinizmus és kultúrforradalom között". in: *Valóság*, 1989/11 S. p56-71).

(7) For a more detailed explanation see: Endre Kiss: "Vorhersehbarkeit und Dezisionismus in der Geschichte", in: *Politische Lageanalyse*. Bruchsal, S. 1993 p119-130).

(8) The fact, that the whole concept of Camus was also formulated in the intellectual context of Hegel-Kojev is explicitly shown in the following passages: "Avec Napoléon et Hegel, philosophe napoléonien, commencent les temps de l'efficacité" (p166); "Hegel termine superbement l'histoire en 1807..." (p252); "Il a cru que l'histoire en 1807, avec Napoléon et lui-même, était achevée, que l'affirmation était possible et le nihilisme vaincu..." (p180). All quotations from: Albert Camus, *L'Homme révolté*. Paris, 1951.

(9) See a basic inquiry of Gehlen: 'Über kulturelle Kristallisation' (1961), in the book *Studien zur Anthropologie* (1971) – Gehlen clearly and obviously defines states of affairs he makes the criteria of his own end-of-history theory (by which he clearly proves, only through an articulated definition of these criteria is it possible at all, to talk about the end of history): 'I bound myself therefore with a preliminary condition, that ideological history is closed down' (same place) – this idea of Gehlen satisfies in a classical sense the most important science-theoretical criterion of any theory that can be made about the end of history, as *the end of history is not some kind of a caesura or special state of the process of history, but a change taking place in the basic criterion which definitively constitutes history*.

(10) Rainer Piepmeyer, "Das Ende der Geschichte", in: Willi Oelmüller (ed), *Normen und Geschichte*. 1979.

(11) This example is being considered the ideal-typical opinion of all-time everyday consciousness about the thought of the end of history. It's not to doubt either, that various versions of this attitude have also articulated themselves at great researchers of thinking (*Burke, Tocqueville, Mannheim*). To see several projections of the thought 'Who haven't lived before the revolution, don't know what life is' see: Karl Mannheim, *Der Konservatismus*. (Frankfurt am Main, 1984. p37).

(12) The Summer 1989 edition of *The National Interest* contains a matchless list of misunderstandings of theoretical magnitude, which are also theoretically relevant on their own.

(13) "The most serious efforts at writing Universal Histories were undertaken, however, in the German idealist tradition. The idea was proposed by the great Immanuel Kant...This work (The Idea of a General History from the View of a World-Citizen- E. K.)...defined the essential terms of reference for all subsequent efforts to write a Universal History...Kant's essay did not itself constitute a Universal History...his idea merely pointed to the need for a new Kepler or Newton who could explain the universal laws of human historical evolution...It is remarkable the extent in which Hegel's system fulfilled all the particulars of Kant's proposal for a Universal History, both in form and substance." Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York, Toronto, etc. 1992. S. 57-59.

(14) *The End of History*, 58.

(15) Of course it needed further examination, how come it was possible to *entirely* and *organically* fit two leading figures of classical German philosophy, Kant and Hegel into a universal historical-philosophical discussion right two hundred years later. Our explanation in its thesis-like form relies on the thesis of the several undoubted 'external' and 'internal' similarities of the two eras only in a smaller proportion. Our explanation, in its thesis-like form already, relies more on the power of the social-ontological groundedness of classical German idealism; this is the solid ground which contains the essential contents and relations of social existence originally

in a reflected way, which are evidently common even in a row of otherwise most diverse eras. In more detail: Endre Kiss: Eternal Peace at the Age of Globalization (Az örök béke a globalizáció korában. in: *Világosság*, 2000/3, 27-35).

(16) It also goes for this case, that the application of the end-of-history thesis *stands or falls depending on the application of previously given criteria*. Another criterion can't even be mentioned, unless we have given that one as a preliminary criterion. This also goes for excellent theoreticals like Leo *Strauss* or Allan *Bloom*. We may not need to add here too, that this defining role of the crucial criterion doesn't carry any kind of arbitrariness concerning the concrete choice of a criterion. An irrelevant criterion terminates its own validity already at the first cases of application.

(17) Presuming existing socialism as an ideological construction is by no means equal to the problem of the *actual existence* of ideologies within the regime of existing socialism. The debates following 1989 at the field of publications as well as sciences came up right from the not-understanding of the real relationship of social reality and ideologies, by what the success of understanding is being critically endangered.

(18) The defining role of the Lord-Servant problem in the thinking of not only the young, but also the mature Marx is a connection proven for us too, grounded philologically and interpretatively at the same time. The Lord-Servant problem, being transponated from Marxist philosophy (through the historical materialism of the 2<sup>nd</sup> *Internationale*) to Leninism, then to Stalin's Soviet-Marxism, of course means new philosophical frames, but the defining, constituting role of this approach doesn't depend on the level of philosophical differentiation, this is harmonically made up by the act of all these philosophies considering history the re-formulation of the Lord-Servant problem, more simply, the continuation of this problem.

(19) Thus we could also define the divided world as two political-geographical hemispheres *pointing at each other*, both of which blamed the other one with maintaining a form of the Lord-Servant relation raised to the level of state-reason. Looking from this point, we can of course be even more amazed about the ones that were at a hostile loss when seeing the actualization of the Lord-Servant model.

(20) This side of the end-of-history theory doesn't only cross to the territory of political-philosophical analysis, but there it's capable of enlightening elements which remained unreachable for different approaches. *We mostly mean the role of the battle of values in the decline of existing socialism*.

(21) Again, we're bumping into the problem, as the fate of any forecast is not independent from the activity of the executive authority which makes decisions in the situation outlined by the forecast. And of course that's the point where the temptation is strongest, to simply charge bad decisions on the account of the forecast, like any forecast was able to make the sphere of political execution unnecessary.